p211
[The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was] brought in
by the London and New York banks to enforce [third world] debt repayment and
act as "debt policeman." Public spending for health, education
and welfare in debtor countries was slashed, following IMF orders to ensure
that the banks got timely debt service on their petrodollars. The banks also
brought pressure on the U.S. government to bail them out from the consequences
of their imprudent loans, using taxpayer money and U.S. assets to do it. The
results were austerity measures for Third World countries and taxation for
American workers to provide welfare for the banks.
p214
When new oil reserves were discovered in Mexico in the 1970s, President Jose
Lopez Portillo undertook an impressive modernization and industrialization
program, and Mexico became the most rapidly growing economy in the developing
world. But the prospect of a strong industrial Mexico on the southern border of
the United States was intolerable to certain powerful
Anglo-American interests, who determined to sabotage Mexico's industrialization
by securing rigid repayment of its foreign debt. That was when interest rates
were tripled. Third World loans were particularly vulnerable to this
manipulation, because they were usually subject to floating or variable
interest rates.'
Why did Mexico need to go into debt to foreign
lenders? It had its own oil in abundance. It had accepted development loans
earlier, but it had largely paid them off. The problem
for Mexico was that it was one of those intrepid countries that had declined to
let its national currency float. Mexico's dollar reserves were exhausted by
speculative raids in the 1980s, forcing it to
borrow just to defend the value of the peso. According to Henry Liu, writing in
The Asia Times Mexico's mistake was in keeping its currency freely convertible
into dollars, requiring it to keep enough dollar reserves to buy back the pesos
of anyone wanting to sell. When those reserves ran out, it had to borrow
dollars on the international market just to maintain its currency peg.
In 1982, President Portillo warned of "hidden
foreign interests" that were trying to destabilize Mexico through panic
rumors, causing capital flight out of the country. Speculators
were cashing in their pesos for dollars and depleting the government's dollar
reserves in anticipation that the peso would have to be devalued. In an
attempt to stem the capital flight, the government cracked under the pressure
and did devalue the peso; but while the currency immediately lost 30 percent of
its value, the devastating wave of speculation continued. Mexico was
characterized as a "high-risk country," leading international lenders
to decline to roll over their loans. Caught by peso devaluation, capital
flight, and lender refusal to roll over its debt, the country faced economic
chaos. At the General Assembly of the United Nations, President Portillo called
on the nations of the world to prevent a "regression into the Dark
Ages" precipitated by the unbearably high interest rates of the global
bankers.
In an attempt to stabilize the situation, the
President took the bold move of taking charge of the banks. The Bank of Mexico
and the country's fm-o" private banks were taken over by the governments
with compensation to their private owners. It was the sort of move calculated
to set off alarm bells for the international banking cartel. A global movement to nationalize the
banks could destroy
their whole economic empire. They wanted the banks privatized and under
their control. The U.S. Secretary of State was then George Shultz, a major
player in the 1971 unpegging of the dollar from gold. He responded with a plan
to save the Wall Street banking empire by having the IMF act as debt policeman.
Henry Kissinger's consultancy firm was called in to design the program. The
result, says Engdahl, was "the most concerted organized looting operation
in modern history," carrying "the most onerous debt collection terms
since the Versailles reparations process of the early 1920s," the debt
repayment plan blamed for propelling Germany into World War II.
Mexico's state-owned banks were returned to private
ownership , but they were sold strictly to domestic Mexican purchasers. Not
until the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was foreign competition
even partially allowed. Signed by Canada, Mexico and the United States, NAFTA
established a "free-trade" zone in North America to take effect on
January 1, 1994. In entering the agreement, Carlos Salinas, the outgoing
Mexican President, broke with decades of Mexican policy of high tariffs to
protect state-owned industry from competition by U.S. corporations.
By 1994, Mexico had restored its standing with
investors. It had balanced budget, a growth rate of over three percent, and a
stock market that was up five-fold. In February 1995, Jane Ingraham wrote in
The New American that Mexico's fiscal policy was in some respects
"superior and saner than our own wildly spendthrift Washington
circus." Mexico received enormous amounts of foreign investment, after
being singled out as the most promising and safest of Latin American markets.
Investors were therefore shocked and surprised when newly-elected President
Ernesto Zedillo suddenly announced a 13 percent devaluation of the peso, since
there seemed no valid reason for the move. The following day, Zedillo allowed
the formerly managed peso to float freely against the dollar. The peso
immediately plunged by 39 percent.
What was going on? In 1994, the U.S. Congressional
Budget Office Report on NAFTA had diagnosed the peso as "overvalued" by
20 percent. The Mexican government was advised to unpeg the currency and let it
float, allowing it to fall naturally to its "true" level. The theory
was that it would fall by only 20 percent; but that is not what happened.
Speculators pushed the peso down sharply and abruptly, collapsing its value.
The collapse was blamed on the lack of "investor confidence" due to
Mexico's negative trade balance; but as Ingraham observes, investor confidence
was quite high immediately before the collapse. If a negative trade balance is
what sends a currency into massive devaluation and hyperinflation, the U.S.
dollar itself should have been driven there long ago. By 2001, U.S. public and
private debt totaled ten times the debt of all Third World countries combined.
Although the peso's collapse was supposedly
unanticipated, over 4 billion U.S. dollars suddenly and mysteriously left
Mexico in the 20 days before it occurred. Six months later, this money had
twice the Mexican purchasing power it had earlier. Later commentators
maintained that lead investors with inside information precipitated the
stampede out of the peso. The suspicion was that these investors were the same
parties who profited from the Mexican bailout that followed. When Mexico's
banks ran out of dollars to pay off its creditors (which were largely U.S.
banks), the U.S. government stepped in with U.S. tax dollars. The Mexican
bailout was engineered by Robert Rubin, who headed the investment bank Goldman
Sachs before he became U.S. Treasury Secretary. Goldman Sachs was then heavily
invested in short-term dollar-denominated Mexican bonds. The bailout was
arranged the day of Rubin's appointment. The money provided by U.S. taxpayers
did not go to Mexico but went straight into the vaults of Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, and other big American lenders whose risky loans were on the line.
The late Jude Wanniski was a conservative economist
who was at one time a Wall Street Journal editor and adviser to President
Reagan. He cynically observed of this baker coup:
There was a big party at Morgan Stanley after the
Mexican peso devaluation, people from all over Wall Street came, they drank
champagne and smoked cigars arid congratulated themselves on how they pulled it
off and they made a fortune. These people are pirates, international pirates.
The loot was more than just the profits of gamblers
who had bet the right way. The pirates actually got control of Mexico's banks.
NAFTA rules had already opened the nationalized Mexican banking system to a
number of U.S. banks, with Mexican licenses being granted to 18 big foreign
banks and 16 brokers including Goldman Sachs. But these banks could bring in no
more than 20 percent of the system's total capital, limiting their market share
in loans and securities holdings." By 2004, this
limitation had been removed. All but one of Mexico's major banks had been sold
to foreign banks, which gained total access to the formerly closed Mexican
banking market.
The value of Mexican pesos and Mexican stocks
collapsed together, supposedly because there was a stampede to sell and no one
around to buy; but buyers with ample funds were sitting on the sidelines,
waiting to pick over the devalued stock at bargain basement prices. The result
was a direct transfer of wealth from the local economy to international money
manipulators. The devaluation also precipitated a wave of privatizations (sales
of public assets to private corporations), as the Mexican . government tried to
meet its spiraling debt crisis In a February if article called "Militant
Capitalism," David Peterson blamed the rout on an assault on the peso by
short-sellers. He wrote:
The austerity measures that the U.S. government and
the IMF forced on Mexicans in the aftermath of last winter's assault on the
peso by short-sellers in the foreign exchange markets have been something to
behold. Almost overnight, the Mexican people have had to endure dramatic cuts
in government spending; a sharp hike in regressive sales taxes; at least one
million layoffs (a conservative estimate); a spike in interest rates so
pronounced as to render their debts unserviceable ... a collapse in consumer
spending on the order of 25 percent by mid-year; and, in brief, a 10.5 percent
contraction in overall economic activity during the second quarter, with more
of the same sure to follow.
By 1995, Mexico's foreign debt was more than twice
the country's total debt payment for the previous century and a half.
Per-capita income had fallen by almost a third from a year earlier, and Mexican
purchasing power had fallen by well over 50 percent." Mexico was propelled
into a crippling national depression that has lasted for over a decade. As in
the U.S. depression of the 1930s, the actual value of Mexican businesses and
assets did not change during this speculator-induced crisis. What changed was
simply that currency had been sucked out of the economy by investors stampeding
to get out of the Mexican stock market, leaving insufficient money in
circulation to pay workers, buy raw materials, finance loans, and operate the
country. It was further evidence that when short-selling is allowed, currencies
are driven into hyperinflation not by the market mechanism of "supply and
demand" but by the concerted action of currency speculators.
|